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Much has been written about failure on the part of the courts to issue
the structural remedies of dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture in
civil antitrust decisions, especially in those involving violations of
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act. As was pointed out by Walter Adams in a 1951
article and has been repeated by many antitrust experts, the government often
wins "a resounding legal victory only to suffer a crushing economic defeat"
3
due to the unwillingness of the courts to impose effective remedies. As
Dewey stated, "it is a commonplace in antitrust work that the government
4
wins the opinions and the defendants win the decrees."
Why the courts are apparently so reluctant to use structural remedies
has been discussed in the antitrust literature during the last several decades
and a variety of arguments are typically presented in textbooks on the econ
omics of antitrust. This paper considers one of the often-repeated arguments
against the use of structural remedies in civil antitrust cases. The argu
ment considered herein is the equity argument that such remedies cause harm
to "innocent" investors.^ The validity of other arguments against the use
of such remedies is not considered herein. In addition, the economic justi-
•j
fication for the use of structural remedies (namely, th.at a more competitive
market structure will induce greater economic efficiency and that in some
cases structural change may be the only means of restoring competition)' is
taken as valid and is not given further consideration.
The first section presents the traditional equity argument against the
use of structural remedies as developed by Donald Dewey. The next section
considers this argument in view of recent contributions in the area of com
pensation and transitional equity. Arguments against the use of compensation
and a viable alternative to condensation are then considered. The final
section provides a brief summary of the major conclusions of the paper.
I. The Traditional Equity Argument
Donald Dewey was the first to present the effect-on-ihvestors argument
as the major reason for the discrepancy between decision and decree.
"... dissolution and divestiture suits are conducted upon a
premise which most judges ,and laymen really do not accept.
Unlike the advocates of.strong remedies, they are not con
vinced that the exercise of monopoly power which has been
acquired by means neither actionable nor indictable per se
violates the law to an extent justifying its elimination
without a sympathetic attention to the position of workers
and stockholders whose interests may adversely be affected
by trust-busting."^
Dewey notes that"... the possibility that the elimination of power over price
may injure the fortunes of innocent parties is seldom explicitely explored
in antitrust suits.
"... the need for the calculated doing of d.amage to property
values is never made apparent in an antitrust case. On the
contrary, federal attorneys, as a matter of trial technique,
resolutely deny that their requests for relief will adversely
affect the interests of workers and stockholders."®
The major reason Dewey gives for the tjrpical lack of explicit considera
tion is that "it is the 'con^any' that is charged with violating the anti
trust laws....' Since the corporation is a fictitious person, during the-
trial the court is under no obligation to take cognizance of the obvious;
namely, that the beneficiaries of any successful 'attempt to monopolize' are
those stockholders, workers, and executives who realized capital gains or
higher incomes as a consequence of unlawful business aggrandizement."
However, while Dewey argues that no explicit consideration is given, he
does find that implicitely the courts must and do atten^t to weigh possible
public gains against possible private losses and that "... the more problem
atical the public benefit, the greater the proper conservative bias in
favor of private claims.Based on the belief that law enforcement should
penalize only those parties responsible for illegal actions, Dewey argues
that those who would be adversely affected by structural remedies are not
typically those responsible for the antitrust violation under consideration.
"When a corporation's monopoly power antedates the antitrust suit
by more than a few years, the presumption is that most persons
currently dependent upon the corporation for an income have not
materially profited from its exercise.
A related consideration emphasized by Elzinga and Breit in their 1976
book is that structural remedies are in effect, penalties. Yet "In United
States antitrust law, DDD is not seen as a penalty for antitrust violations
but rather aff. a remedy to be applied in situations where coiqjetition cannot
be restored otherwise. The Supreme Court has held that, in antitrust civil
proceedings, the courts are not 'to punish antitrust violators, and relief
must not be punitive',,.. To achieve a truly, nonpunitive dismemberment of a
firm (or industry), as Donald Dewey has argued, is almost a contradiction
. . ..12in terras."
Despite Dewey's claim that effects on investors are only implicitely
considered by the courts, he cites in a footnote in his 1959 text a case in
which such considerations were explicit in Judge Sandborn's objection in 1914
to a decree ordered in the International Harvester Company case which would
have divided the coiiq)any into three units.
"'Its business was conducted openly without legal challenge or
attack, so far as this record shows, during all these years, and .
it is not iir5)robable that many parties hold stock of the Inter
national Company which they purchased during these ten years in
reliance upon these facts, the value of which a decree against
the defendants will greatly depreciate. So it is that in any
event this suit does not appeal to the conscience of a chancel
lor with the force it might have had in 1903 or 1904 before the
actual conduct of the business of the defendants had demonstrated
its innocuous effect and no parties had been induced to act in
reliance upon its freedom from attack.
That the effect on investors continues to be taken into account in at
least some instances is evidenced by an example cited in the 1973 Breit and
Elzinga article that considers the availability and feasibility of various
antitrust remedies and penalties. These two authors almost immediately
reject structural remedies as effective means of antitrust violation deter
rence and they cite the following recent use of the effect-on-investors
argument for the consent decree reached in the ITT case.
"Most of the assets originally listed in the Government's com
plaint remained untouched by the settlement. One of the reasons
given by former Antitrust Division Chief,'.Richard McLaren," was
that divestiture of those assets would adversely affect ITT's
stock prices and therefore penalize its shareholders."
One can summarize and state more fully the assumptions and specific
equity problem raised by Dewey's effect-on-investors argument as follows.
It is assumed that the degree of monopoly power possessed by a corporation
will be capitalized into the price of the corporation's securities. Struc
tural remedies are aimed at reducing the monopoly power of the corporation
and, if successful, the market values of the corporation's securities will
fall, causing a capital loss to the current holders of the corporation's
securities. The equity problem arises because of the likelihood, and occurs
to the extent, that those holding the corporation's securities at the time of
the remedy ("current investors") are not the same individuals who held the
securities when the monopoly power was created or increased ("old investors").
It is assimied that the corporation's monopoly power or increase in monopoly
power was capitalized into the prices at which the "old investors" sold the
securities to the "current investors". Thus, the "old investors" received a
capital gain as a result of their security ownership, whereas the "current
investors" will suffer a capital loss if structural remedies are imposed.
In other words, those who benefited from the creation or extension of monopoly
power and who may have been at least partially responsible for the creation
of that monopoly power (for example, by their direct or indirect participation
in the corporation's policies and/or management selection), are not those
whose securities decrease in market value due to the later use of structural
remedies.
Dewey finds only two situations in which structural remedies are appro
priate. The first is "where any financial loss will fall upon the persons who
have engineered the unlawful suppression of competition" and Dewey notes that
"the most severe decrees involving dissolution and divestiture have been
returned against companies whose major stockholders have been personally
responsible for the castigated policies of their firms.As examples,
Dewey cites cases involving the tabacco, petroleum and railroad Industries.
The second situation is "when the target is monopoly power which cannot be
capitalized; that is, when it is inseparably bound up with the acumen or
charisma of particular individuals."^^ Dewey concludes that,
"In short, meaningful antimonopoly remedies can be anticipated
only when it is possible for judges to 'personalize' the issues,
which is to say that until the courts can bring themselves to
Impose decrees that seriously menace the interests of innocent
parties the Sherman Act can never serve as an^instrument to
further anyone's program for laissez-faire."
II. The Appropriateness and Feasibility of Compensation
Despite the apparent long-standing acceptance of Dewey's main arguments
and of his conclusion that the courts' conservatism in the use of structural
remedies is both "understandable and commendable";^^ further consideration
of the equity effects of such remedies is warranted, especially in light of
recent theoretical contributions in the area of coirq)ensation. Such research
by economists in the fields of public choice and public finance has focused
on the appropriateness from an equity viewpoint and the feasibility of
compensation In response to proposed changes in tax legislation. Such analyses
and policy prescriptions can and should be applied to both changes in the use
19
of structural remedies under existing antitrust law and to proposals call
ing for near-automatic restructuring of monopolistic and oligopolistic
industries when specified structural, conduct, and/or performance criteria
reflective of "undue" monopoly power have been found to exist in a firm or
industry.
Mention has sometimes been made of the possibility of compensation for
the capital losses experienced by investors as a result of structural remedies.
While Dewey mentions that compensation is an alternative to existing policy,
he finds the likely administrative difficulties with such an approach to be
21
the probable reason why compensation is "never seriously proposed." However,
Asch, in his textbook discussion of Dewey's general argument, recognizes that
22
compensation to individuals harmed by structural remedies may be possible.
Nevertheless, full consideration of compensation is not given in the antitrust
literature.
It must first be recognized that arguments against the use of structural
remedies "vrtiich focus on the equity effects on "innocent" investors and on the
necessity of compensation are based on short run transitional considerations,
rather than on more long run permanent problems. While Dewey does not state
it as such, his basic argument presented above is concerned solely with the
effects on investors of a change in policy from the current situation of very
little or in effect no use of structural remedies (in cases under Section 2
of the Sherman Act) to a situation where such remedies are in^osed frequently
enough that expectations form In the minds of Investors concerning the
probability that such remedies will be applied In similar future instances.
7 !
A. Equity and Condensation Considerations After the Policy Transition
For now, ignore the transitional difficulties (which will be considered
subsequently) and consider first the situation that would exist after such a
policy transition has been completed. After the policy transition there would
exist a general awareness among potential and actual investors that structural
remedies are included among the possible antitrust remedies, similar to the
current knowledge that fines, prison terms, injunctions, treble damages, etc.
are possible outcomes of antitrust violations. Just as is currently the
case, investors would then make their decisions concerning which securities
to purchase on the basis of relative expectations of earnings. However, such
earnings, expectations would then take into account the probabilities attached
to structural remedies being iir5>osed, which, ceteris paribus, would decrease
the values of the securities of those corporations which are likely to face
antitrust violations of the type where structural remedies may be utilized.
Using accepted investment terminology and theory, investors valuate
securities on the basis of their relative present values (PVs), where
(1) PV= § ^
(1 + r)^
The r in the denominator is the prevailing rate of return on other assets in
the same risk class. is the expected value of returns in period t, where
(2) \ T R . • Pr(i), with 2 Pr(i) = 1.
t t,i
Pr(i) is the investor's estimate of the probability that state i will occur
^t,i level of net returns associated with each state.
Let state 2 in equation (2) above be the situation where structural
remedies are issued when the courts have found, for example, a Section 2
8Sherman Act violation. Dewey argues that structural remedies are unfair
because investors have been led to assume (based on past antitrust decrees)
that Pr(2) is zero or very close to zero and they have made their investment
purchases accordingly. To the extent that expected returns (under this
assumption) have been higher for those firms which hold illegal monopoly
power, the present value and price of the securities of such firms have been
higher.
Once the policy transition is completed, investors will upwardly revise
the probability estimates they attach to state 2 occurring, with the result
that, ceteris paribus, the expected returns from ownership of the securities
of likely monopoly violators will decrease, causing a decrease in the present
value and price of such securities.
Thus, once the policy transition is completed, the equity argument
against the use of structural remedies loses its validity. While those
investors who purchased securities of a firm after its monopoly power was
created or extended would suffer capital losses as a result of the imposition
of structural remedies, they would not be "innocent" in that they chose to
purchase the securities given the risks and returns attached thereto.
Ceteris paribus, such investors would be compensated by the market in the
form of higher than normal returns on reduced security prices for the
additional risk incurred in purchasing the securities of a corporation that
may be operating in violation of the antitrust laws. Therefore, no equity
argument against the use of structural remedies is justified in the long-run
sense (that is, after the policy transition has been completed); similarly,
there is no justification for condensation after the transition has been
completed.
B. Equity and Compensation Considerations During the Policy Transition
Much of the recent work on coinpensation as a means of removing horizontal
equity problems accompanying policy changes is attributable to Hochman who
presented a paper entitled "Rule Changes and Transitional Equity" at the 1972
24
Urban Institute Conference on Redistribution through Public Choice. Subse
quently, Martin Feldstein extended the analysis in the context of tax reform
25
in two 1976 journal articles.
The equity considerations that prompted Dewey and others to disfavor
the use of structural remedies would be eliminated if full compensation were
given (during the policy transition) to those individuals who hold the
securities of the corporations that have violated the antitrust laws. As
Feld-stein points out, determining both the appropriate recipients and amounts
26
of conqjensation would in some cases be a difficult task. However, Feldstein
sites policy changes affecting the value of assets as an exatt^jle of a
situation where conqjensation is feasible.
"Compensation would be easiest for tax changes that affect the
value of assets for which prices are continuously available.
For example, when a change in future tax liabilities is capi
talized in the value of a stock or bond, the owner of that
security could be con5>ensated on the basis of the difference
between the value of the stock or bond before the tax change
and its value after the law has changed."27
Thus, the mechanism for calculating the appropriate amount of compensa
tion per security would be via reliance on the securities market, wherein
the probability of decreased returns attributable to structural remedies
would be taken into account. While the occasional layman investor probably
would be unable to accurately assign the appropriate probability of structural
remedies occurring in the relevant future for each available security, one
can assume that there would exist a sufficient number of informed investors
to enable the market to accurately reflect the decreased market value of
securities attributable to the policy change.
10
But, while compensation would be feasible during a policy change in the
use of structural remedies, some difficulties would surely arise. Two areas
of difficulties concerning compensation that would present themselves in the
context of a structural remedy policy change, but would not arise or not arise
to the same extent with a tax reform, are discussed below. Possible ways of
dealing with some of these difficulties are also suggested.
I
First, whereas it would be fairly single to calculate the effect on a
corporation's net returns from some tax policy changes, much more uncertainty
might surround the antitrust policy change considered in this paper. In the
latter policy change, uncertainty would first exist concerning the probability
of structural remedies being issued against a particular corporation. A
practical means of reducing this cause of uncertainty under existing antitrust
laws would be by having the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission announce fairly detailed guidelines for the use of structural
28
remedies, such as the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines issued in 1968.
Something similar to such guidelines are included as part of most of the
industrial reorganization legislative proposals; these typically require some
quantitative structure, conduct and/or performance criteria to be met by a
firm and/or industry before the statute is applicable.
A second tjrpe of uncertainty would exist regarding the effects of struc
tural remedies on individual corporation's net returns. It would be left^ to
the securities market to establish post-policy change security prices. This
second type of uncertainty applies less to tax policy changes than to struc-
29
tural proposals.
Another problem area with compensation is the appropriateness and feasi
bility of withholding compensation from some security holders. The basis for
compensation, as presented above, is to avoid penalizing investors who, as
11
Elzinga and Breit refer to it, "bought-in-late" (i.e., purchased securities
of a corporation after the monopoly power was created or extended). A
question arises as to the appropriateness of compensating those investors
who purchased the securities prior to the acquisition of illegal monopoly
power and retain ownership of the same securities when the policy change
occurs. Equity considerations do not require that such investors be com
pensated; however, if they were excluded from compensation, they would have
an incentive to quickly sell securities for which they expect the price to
fall due to the policy change.
Also, monopoly power is rarely, if ever, created instantaneously; rather,
it normally evolves over time, although perhaps in spurts. If an attempt
were made to exclude from condensation those investors who retained ownership
of the securities while the monopoly power was being established, a somewhat
arbitrary cut-off date would have to be established, either for all securities
or for each security.
A similar difficulty arises concerning those investors who owned the
securities of a corporation prior to its acquisition or extension of monopoly
power and then sold the securities at prices reflecting the monopoly power.
A case could be made for retroactively taxing such capital gains to provide
funds to compensate "innocent" investors, because those capital gains resulted
from the development or extension of illegal monopoly power. However, such
a policy may be impractical from a legal viewpoint as well as being considered
unjust, since past enforcement policies have not given investors any reason
to believe they would be subject to such penalties after they sold the
securities.
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III. Arguments Against Compensation and Alternatives to Compensation
Both Hochman and Feldstein discuss some circumstances under which equity
considerations do not require compensation and/or where only partial compen
sation may be appropriate. Only those two circumstances applicable to the
issue at hand (antitrust remedy policy change) will be discussed herein.
A. Overconq)ensation
Feldstein argues that providing "complete" compensation (that is, paying
investors the full amount by which their security values decrease due to the
policy change) may well result in "overcompensation" because some of the
losers (in the absence of compensation) will also be indirect gainers from
30
the policy change. Thus, investors who receive complete con^jensation may
be net gainers from the policy change. For example, many of those who hold
securities of corporations in violation of the antitrust laws may have
diversified portfolios with holdings in competing firms or industries; with
complete compensation, such investors will be net gainers in that, after the
policy change, the values of their other securities, ceteris paribus, will
rise. Feldstein considers such indirect gains to be secondary effects of
the policy change and hei argues that, on the average, they are sufficiently
small that they can be ignored and "must...be ignored in any practical
system of conqiensation.
Similarly, it can be argued that in the context of a change in the use
of structural remedies, the losers (in the absence of compensation) will
also be indirect gainers from the increased competition and efficiency which
will presumably result from the use of structural remedies. While this would
likewise call for less than full compensation, practical considerations would
preclude estimation of these indirect gains from the policy change.
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B. Anticipation
A second and more serious compensation consideration is discussed by
both Hochman and Feldstein. Hochirian notes that, "In determining \rtiether
compensation must be considered an ethical requirement, the ability of
individuals to anticipate change and adjust their behavior to curtail poten
tial losses is crucial.As Feldstein states, "The most serious objection
to compensation in tax reform is that the prospective losers recognize that
they are taking a risk of tax reform when they buy certain types of property..
33
These risks are reflected in asset prices,..."
Both authors present the exan^le of elimination of the oil depletion
allowance and note that the frequent discussion of this policy change should
have resulted in current investors being aware of the risks of the policy
change with the result that "The price of oil stocks are therefore, low in
relation to current earnings, or, equivalently investors in oil stocks are
compensated [with high rates of return] for the perceived risk of tax reform.
34
They knowingly take the gamble and should not be compensated if they lose."
In such a situation the policy transition has already been anticipated,
making conq>ensation inappropriate.
To at least some extent^ one might expect anticipation to have occurred
with respect to a potential change in the use of structural remedies. Under
existing antitrust law, possible structural remedies have been discussed in
the media for some of the firms and industries involved in current antitrust
investigations and litigation; exan^les include cases involving AT&T,
IBM, the cereal industry and the petroleum industry. To the extent investors
believe such remedies to be likely outcomes of current cases, the price of
the securities of these firms should already adequately reflect the perceived
35
risks. If this has occurred, no compensation would be warranted, as in the
14
oil depletion allowance policy change discussed above. However, the rare
use of structural remedies in all but merger cases in recent times probably
has precluded full, if not even substantial security market adjustment in
anticipation of the use of structural remedies.
Both Hochman and Feldstein also provide some practical alternatives to
compensation that may reduce, but will not eliminate completely, transitional
inequity in situations where compensation is not feasible. The primary
alternative both suggest is postponement of the policy change. As Feldstein
states, postponement here is referring to "current enactment with a future
36
effective date, and not merely postponed enactment." Feldstein argues
that postponement helps balance efficiency and equity considerations in that
it reduces the loss associated with policy changes In two ways: (1) post
ponement reduces the present value of Individual losses and (2) postponement
encourages a reallocation of resources away from the activity so that its
37
gross return rises. Feldstein also argues that postponement is preferable
to a partial change or gradual change in that postponement maximizes the
38
opportunities for a favorable reallocation of resources.
Given the goal of trying to utilize the most workable means of changing
the use of structural remedies with as little harm to "innocent" investors
as is feasible, and taking into account all the factors raised above concern
ing the appropriateness and feasibility of compensation, postponement may be
preferable to compensation. Substantial postponement is already built into
antitrust enforcement. The typical time delay between when an antitrust case
is first investigated and when charges are filed and the even longer common
lag between the filing and when the case is finally resolved after possible
postponements and appeals, allows what should be adequate time for
39market adjustments to reduce the equity necessity of compensation. In
15
effect, such time lags provide the postponement of policy changes Hochman
and Feldstein suggest as a practical alternative to compensation. But,
because this type of postponement varies from case to case a common minimum
postponement time could easily be provided by specifying a future effective
date of the policy change.
Similar automatic postponement and consequent security market adjustment
should also occur if any of the proposed industrial reorganization laws are
enacted. The necessary investigation time, especially given the wide appli
cability of these proposed statutes, should provide substantial time during
which the market could at least partially adjust to the policy change,
making condensation less necessary. In addition, it is likely that such
legislation would include a specified time lag before it goes into effect.
Thus, while compensation may be one solution to the equity considerations
accon^anying a policy change affecting the use of structural remedies, a
viable alternative would be automatically provided by market adjustments,
given advanced notification and thereby sufficient time to adjust to the
policy change before enforcement is begun.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has focused on one of the justifications typically presented
for the courts' reluctance to impose structural relief ini'civil antitrust
cases, especially those brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. First,
Dewey's effect-on-investors equity argument was fully stated. It was then
shown that, while this argument does raise a legitimate concern, it applies
only during the policy transition and thus is only a short run problem. It
was also shown that the equity argument is valid only for those investors
(referred to as "innocent investors") who purchased securities of.a corpora
tion after its monopoly power was capitalized into security prices.
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The possibility of net efficiency gains from the policy change motivates
serious consideration of compensation to make equitable the process of
achieving efficiency gains. Thus, the appropriateness and feasibility of
compensating investors who are harmed during the policy transition was con
sidered. While some difficulties in implementing compensation were noted,
such as the possibility of overcompensation and determining which Investors
should be con^ensated and by how much, many of the difficulties are manageable.
Thus, compensation appears sufficiently workable to warrant serious consid
eration.
Finally, a partial alternative to compensation, that would reduce but
not completely eliminate transitional inequity, was considered; this alterna
tive is a delayed policy change that would enable the security and commodity
markets to adjust to the policy change prior to its implementation. It was
noted that, all factors considered, postponement may be preferable to compensation,
In summary, the use of either compensation or postponement, by eliminating
or reducing transitional inequity, should make acceptable a policy change in
the use of structural remedies in situations where effective competition and
efficiency cannot be achieved through alternative means. Dewey's effect-on-
investors equity argument should no longer be presented or interpreted as
necessarily precluding structural remedies in civil antitrust cases.
17
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**The author wishes to express thanks to Roy D. Adams for helpful comments
and suggestions.
^Throughout this paper the term structural Remedies will be used in the
generic sense to refer to dissolution, divorcement and divestiture; the
distinctions between these terms are unimportant to the issues considered
in this paper.
This paper is concerned primarily with the use -of structural relief
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and, to. a lesser extent, under other
sections of the antitrust laws and under proposed antitrust legislation. It
is recognized that structural relief is commonly used for merger violations
brought under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
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^^Supra note 4, at 100-101.
^^Id. at 101.
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^^Id. at 101.
^®Id. at 102.
^^The use of structural remedies under existing antitrust law could be
changed by legislation, by court interjjretation and decision, and to some
extent by enforcement agency practices, guidelines and requests for
structural relief.
^^Three proposals of this type are as follows: Kaysen and Turner's
"Draft Antitrust Law", Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy:
An Economic and Legal Analysis 266-272 (1959); "The Concentrated Industries
Act" which was one of the proposals of Phil C. Neal et. al., White House
Task Force Proposal (1968), reprinted in 2 Antitrust Law and Economics
11-12, 30-33 (1968-1969); Philip Hart's "Industrial Reorganization Bill",
S. 3832, reprinted in U.S., Congressional Record, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 118,
part 19, 24925-24935 (1972).
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^^Martin Feldstein, Coiiq)ensation in Tax Reform, 29 National Tax Journal
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Feldstein, Compensation]; Martin Feldstein,
On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 Journal of Public Economics (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Feldstein, Theory].
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As an example, Feldstein cites changes in the taxation of labor income.
Feldstein, Compensation at 126.
27
Feldstein, Compensation, at 125. Feldstein also suggests that such
compensation might be best financed by long-term government debt.
28
U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968).
29
Also applicable to both policy changes, as well as to any policy changes
that utilize the market to determine the amount of conq)ensation, are problems
stemming from other changes which affect security prices that may be occur
ring simultaneously with or in close succession or precession with the policy
change. Separating out the effects of changes in other security price
determinants may complicate the calculation of appropriate condensation.
30
Feldstein, Compensation, at 126-27.
31
Id. at 127.
32
Supra note 24, at 326.
33
Feldstein, Condensation, at 127.
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^^Id. at 127.
An example of the stock market's anticipation of adverse antitrust
decisions was cited in the March,?, 1977 issue of Business Week; "The last
time International Business Machines Corp. won an important antitrust case--
the famous action brought by Telex Corp. and-'decided at the U.S. Appeals
Court level in January, 1975--the stock price soared some 17 points in one
day and continued to rise for a couple of months afterwards." Business
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Feldstein, Theory, at 99.
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Feldstein, Theory, at 99; Feldstein, Compensation, at 128.
38
Feldstein, Compensation, at 128. Hochman also discusses several other
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mobility. Supra, note 24, at 330-333.
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Posner's study of antitrust cases found that with respect to monopo
lization cases,
"The average dissolution or divestiture proceeding is substantially
more protracted than the average civil antitrust case. If we
exclude local and small regional monopoly cases..., dissolution or
significant divestiture in a monopolization case has taken an
average of almost eight years. And...this is only the interval
between the filing of the con^jlaint and the final judicial order.
The interval between the formation of the monopoly and the actual
carrying out of divestiture is greater."
Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 Journal of
Law and Economics 404 (1970).
